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PAY-TO-PLAY: MCCUTCHEON V. FEC’S ROBUST EFFECT ON FEDERAL AND STATE
CONTRACTOR CONTRIBUTION REGULATIONS
Tyler C. Stearns
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued the opinion in McCutcheon v.
FEC.1 McCutcheon was among a series of cases involving campaign finance regulations which
came into public consciousness following the well-publicized 2012 decision in Citizens United v.
FEC.2 McCutcheon involved a challenge to portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(“FECA”), specifically the portion of FECA that imposes aggregate limits on the amount of money
individuals may contribute to candidates and parties in federal elections.3 The McCutcheon
plaintiffs argued that the aggregate limits violated their right to make political contributions, a right
protected by the First Amendment.4 Prior to the McCutcheon, decision, the aggregate limits
imposed a $123,200 per election cycle limit on the total amount of money individuals may
contribute to all federal elective candidates.5 The question presented to the Court in McCutcheon
was whether the aggregate limits of FECA were valid under the First Amendment. The Court’s
answer to this question undermines over thirty years of campaign finance regulation and
jurisprudence; and arguably will have serious ramifications on influence of political contributions
in federal and state elections.
Announcing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts reinforced that a citizen’s right
to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment.6
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However, the Chief Justice emphasized that this “right is not absolute, and Congress may impose
certain limitations.”7 The Court’s holding reasoned that the aggregate contribution limits were
unconstitutional; stating that limits to political contributions are valid only if their purpose is to
prevent quid pro quo corruption (or its appearance), and the regulation is closely drawn to meet
that purpose.8 Following the Court’s decision, individuals can contribute money to any federal
candidate within the base limits set forth in FECA.9 Consequently, following the McCutcheon
decision, an individual could theoretically donate in excess of $1.5 million dollars per election
cycle.10 For context, in 2010 Democrats and Republicans raised $1.5 billion for Congressional
races.11 Thus, if the aggregate limits were struck down prior to the 2010 election, 429 individuals
contributing the approximate $1.5 million, maximum could have theoretically funded every
winning Congressional candidate.12
The previous example, while not representing fact or likely reality following the
McCutcheon decision, it exposes the potential serious implications of the Supreme Court’s
decision. Those implications extend beyond the validity of the aggregate contribution limits in
FECA and other regulations.13 Outside of the increased dollar amounts stemming from the
McCutcheon decision, the Court’s refined analysis of permissible campaign finance regulations,
which address quid pro quo corruption, raises questions as to the validity of “pay-to-play”
regulations or regulations addressing contributions by government contractors. Pay-to-play
regulations are designed to prevent individuals or companies contracting with the government
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from using monetary contributions to influence the award of future contracts and exert increased
political influence. This Note argues that the McCutcheon decision will have far reaching,
detrimental effects on campaign finance regulations, specifically focusing on pay-to-play
regulations.
This Note begins by examining the breadth of the protections the First Amendment
provides to political contributions14 Part I sets out the background and history of federal
jurisprudence with respect to regulation of political contributions. Part II focuses on the Supreme
Court’s analysis of political contribution regulations in McCutcheon. Part III discusses and reviews
prior state and federal pay-to-play regulations by applying the Supreme Court’s analysis in
McCutcheon. Part IV discusses the effect of campaign contributions on federal contract awards
and how the McCutcheon decision implicates federal contractor contributions. Furthermore, Part
V applies the McCutcheon decision to the federal and state pay-to-play regulations, and concludes
that the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon may invalidate or force reformation of federal and state payto-play regulations. Part VI analyzes the practical implications of the McCutcheon decision on
campaign financing.

II: HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION — BUCKLEY V. VALEO
“No enemy of free government [is] more dangerous and none so insidious” as
contributions by corporations for political reasons.15
– President Theodore Roosevelt
Addressing Congress in 1904, President Roosevelt underscored the threat of corruption
arising from political contributions, calling for “vigorous measures to eradicate” perceived
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See infra, Part III.
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political corruption.16 In his address, the President emphasized Congress’s role in addressing
political corruption, stating:
[i]t is accepted that Congress has power under the Constitution to regulate the
election of federal officers, including the President and the Vice President.17 This
includes the authority to protect the elective processes against the ‘two great natural
and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption.’18
In his annual address to Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt echoed his previous
calls for campaign finance regulations stating, “all contributions by corporations to any political
committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be
permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind
would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices
acts.”19 Again in 1906, President Roosevelt urged Congress to enact “a law prohibiting
corporations from contributing to the campaign expenses of any party.”20 Congress responded in
1907 by enacting the Tillman Act, the first campaign finance law addressing political
contributions.21 The Tillman Act made it unlawful for national banks or corporations to contribute
money to federal campaigns and opened the door for Congress to take a more pragmatic approach
to campaign finance regulation.22 Following the Tillman Act, Congress passed additional
campaign finance reforms including, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the Hatch Act of
1939, the Smith-Connally Act of 1943, and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.23 Each of these
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Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
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Buckley at 257 (quoting, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884)) (emphasis added).
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Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law xvii (1988).
20
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 509 (quoting 41 Cong. Rec. 22 (1906)).
21
See Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A brief-ish history of campaign finance
reform, WASHINGTON POST, April 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-historyof-campaign-finance-reform-from-george-washington-to-shaun-mccutcheon/.
22
Fed. Election Comm’n, Appendix 4: The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History (accessed April 1,
2015), available at http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm.
23
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (imposing disclosure requirements on House, Senate and
primary candidates; requiring reporting of contributions over $100, and raising Senate expenditure limits to
$25,000); Hatch Act of 1939, 5 U.S.C. 7321-7326 (empowering Congress to regulate primary elections and included
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regulations was crafted with the goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,
which arises from monetary contributions by individuals made in exchange for political
influence.24 However, between 1947 and 1971, Congress took little if any action to curb the
growing influence of money in politics and did little to enforce the pre-existing regulations passed
between 1907 and 1947.25 Notably, following Richard Nixon’s election in 1969, the Clerk of the
House of Representatives notified the Justice Department of twenty fund-raising Committees
associated with now President Nixon that failed to file a single campaign finance disclosure
report.26 The Justice Department responded the following year.27 In its response, the Justice
Department announced that “none of the violators would be prosecuted . . . given the history of
the act” and that enforcement would be unfair.28 In other words, the Justice Department decided
that because they had not previously enforced campaign finance reporting obligations, individuals
should not be punished for failing to abide by the reporting regulations.29 This Justice Department
decision purportedly ended their passive approach to enforcement of campaign finance regulations
as it declared future violators would be prosecuted.30 The failure of Congress to enact more
stringent campaign finance regulations, combined with the Justice Department’s passive

limitations on contributions and expenditures in Congressional elections); Smith-Connally Act of 1943 (expanding
the scope of the Tillman Act to include unions among the entities prohibited from contributing money to federal
campaigns); Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. 80-101 (1947) (prohibiting corporations and unions from making independent
expenditures in federal political campaigns).
24
FEC, supra note 16.
25
See Melvin I.Urofsky, A Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform: Past, Present, and Future: Article: Campaign
Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 25-32 (discussing Congressional infighting during this
period which prevented the passage of additional campaign finance reform).
26
Id. at 32.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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enforcement of the pre-existing regulations made it readily apparent that reform was necessary.
Such reform emerged two years later with the passage Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.31
FECA was a complete overhaul of federal campaign finance and election laws. FECA
broadened reporting and disclosure requirements for political contributions, imposed limitations
on contributions and expenditures, and created provisions for public financing of federal
campaigns.32 In 1974, Congress passed amendments to FECA, including increased limitations on
contributions and expenditures, and critically created the Federal Election Commission; an
independent agency charged with regulation and enforcement of the federal election laws.33
FECA’s wide-ranging reforms helped lift the veil on the use of money in political campaigns, but
also raised questions as to constitutional implications of limitations on contributions and
expenditures. In response to FECA and the 1974 Amendments, Senator James L. Buckley and
Eugene McCarthy challenged the constitutionality of the contribution and expenditure limits,
arguing that the regulations impermissibly abridged constitutionally protected First Amendment
rights.34 Buckley and McCarthy’s challenge to FECA was the first time the Supreme Court was
asked to evaluate the validity of contribution and expenditure limits and shaped future legislation
and judicial review of campaign finance regulations.
The expenditure and contribution limits in FECA implicated the First Amendment’s
protection on political association and political expression.35 Discussing these rights in in NAACP
v. Alabama36, the Court recognized that “effective advocacy of both public and private points of

31

See Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A brief-ish history of campaign finance
reform, WASHINGTON POST, April 3, 2014 (explaining that FECA was amended in 1974 in response to the
Watergate Scandal).
32
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 258.
33
Fed. Election Comm’n, Appendix 4: The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History (accessed April 1, 215), available at http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm.
34
Eugene McCarthy was a former Democratic Congressman and Senator from Minnesota.
35
Buckley at 15.
36
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”37 With
political association and political expression in mind, the Buckley Court expressed that FECA’s
contribution and expenditure limits operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities.38 Thus, because the contribution and expenditure limits implicate First Amendment
rights, the first question considered by the Buckley Court’s review of the FECA regulations was to
what extent the limits abridge First Amendment rights.
The Court’s analysis distinguished the effect the base and aggregate limits had upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights.39 FECA limited the permissible expenditures to a candidate
to $1,000 per election.40 The Buckley Court stated that the $1,000 limit appeared to “exclude all
citizens and groups, except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press” from
substantial use of important methods of communications.41 The Court reasoned that this limitation
on every citizens ability to exercise political speech inhibited political discussion and the quantity
of political expression.42 Such limitations, the Court found, substantially controlled the quantity
and diversity of political speech.43 Thus, because expenditure limits constrain political discussion
and expression, the Court found that such regulations are subject to “the exacting scrutiny
applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights.”44 The Court explained that under
exacting or strict scrutiny, the government may regulate expenditure limits only if the regulation
promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.45

37

Id. at 460.
Buckley at 14.
39
Id. at 14.
40
18 U.S.C. § 608 (e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
41
See Buckley, supra note 20 (noting that a full-page newspaper advertisement in 1975 cost $6,971.04, well above
the $1,000 expenditure limit).
42
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20.
43
Id.
44
Buckley at 44-45.
45
Id. (emphasis added).
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Notably, the Court’s review of contribution limits departed from the strict scrutiny standard
applicable to the expenditure limits and led to a notably different conclusion respecting
contribution regulations.46
The Buckley Court reasoned that campaign contributions were a lesser restraint on
protected First Amendment speech, and therefore contribution regulations should be subject to a
different level of scrutiny.47 Under FECA, individuals and groups were permitted to contribute up
to $1,000 per election and party committees were permitted to donate $5,000 to a single
candidate.48 FECA further limited overall contributions by individuals and groups to all candidates
to $25,000 per calendar year. 49Its analysis, the Court noted that, “a contribution serves as a general
expression of support for the candidate’s views, but does not communicate the underlying basis
for the support.”50According to the Court, the key difference was the communication aspect of the
regulations. The Court reasoned that expenditures allow individuals to express in their own manner
the reasons why they support a candidate, or the reasons they believe a candidate should be elected.
Conversely, campaign contributions “permit the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution”, but did not infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”51
This distinction led the Court to closely drawn scrutiny, a diminished yet “rigorous standard of
review” to limitations on political contributions. 52
To survive strict scrutiny, an expenditure limit regulation must show (1) a compelling
government interest and (2) employ the “least restrictive means” necessary to achieve the

46

Buckley at 20-21.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437.
48
18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(1)-(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
49
18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
50
McCutcheon at 1437.
51
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
52
Buckley at 29.
47
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compelling government interest.53 Comparatively, contribution limits are subject closely draw
scrutiny, where “the State [must] demonstrate a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”54 Thus, the Buckley
court created a critical distinction for contribution regulations in applying closely drawn scrutiny.
This level of scrutiny allows Congress and legislatures greater leeway in enacting regulations
limiting campaign contributions, by permitting these regulations to abridge upon First Amendment
rights so long as they do not unnecessarily abridge associational freedom.55
Another product of the Buckley decision was the Court’s finding that the prevention of quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance qualifies as a sufficiently important government interest.56
The Buckley court ultimately concludes that the campaign contribution regulations in FECA were
valid because they employed means closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption, and that
such regulations did not unnecessarily abridge associational freedoms.57 Future decisions helped
solidify the Court’s conclusions regarding the campaign contributions as permissible to prevent
quid pro quo corruption and are discussed hereafter.
Additional support for base limits on contributions can be found in Nixon v. Shrink.58 Nixon
involved a challenged to a Missouri state law that imposed limits on contributions by individuals
to state office candidates to $275 and $1,075.59 Petitioners challenged the law, alleging that the
contribution limits violated their First Amendment rights.60 The Court upheld the Missouri limits;
applying closely drawn scrutiny in holding that there is “no reason in logic or evidence to doubt

53

See supra note 38.
Buckley at 25 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
59
Nixon at 383.
60
Id. (Petitioners’ Complaint did not specify what First Amendment rights were violated, however the Court
postulated that the regulation implicated freedom of speech and freedom of association).
54
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the sufficiency of Buckley to govern the Missouri case”.61 The Court in Nixon reemphasized the
reasoning in Buckley that, ‘“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” was
found to be a “constitutionally sufficient justification”’, and found authority for Missouri’s law
and other state limits on contributions in the Buckley ruling.62
Contribution limits withstood further scrutiny in McConnell v. FEC.63 McConnell involved
a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).64 The BCRA codified
prohibitions on soft money donations, or donations solicited to a party or committee instead of to
a particular candidate.65 In McConnell, the Court upheld the soft money prohibitions despite
petitioner’s arguments that there was no concrete evidence of real or apparent corruption. 66 The
Court reasoned that the soft money prohibitions prevented ‘undue influence on officeholders’
judgment, and the appearance of corruption.67 Critically, the McConnell court articulated that
Congress’ interest in preventing quid quo pro corruption extends beyond “simple cash-for-votes
corruption”.68 The Court concentrated on evidence of access in exchange for soft money donations
in finding that the contribution bans were sufficient to conclude that the soft money donations in
the BCRA were a valid exercise of Congress’ prevention of the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption.69
The takeaway from the Court’s decision in Buckley and later contribution regulation
decisions was that Congress may enact limitations on political contributions, subject to certain

61

Id.
Id. at 379, 397- 98.
63
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
64
116 Stat. 81.
65
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (Supp.II)).
66
McConnell at 153.
67
Id. (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.431, 441).
68
McConnell at 150-151.
69
Id.
62
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requirements.70 The court determined in Buckley that regulations related to political contributions
must (1) have the goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and (2) the
regulations must be closely drawn to meet that goal without unnecessarily abridging First
Amendment or other constitutional freedoms.71 This reasoning is repeatedly relied upon and
upheld in later decisions, and Congress and state legislatures have utilized these conclusions in
drafting campaign finance laws.72 The contribution limits, while deemed valid by Buckley and
cases challenging comparable contribution regulations, became the subject of further scrutiny
thirty-five years later in McCutcheon. The Court’s decision in McCutcheon agreed with the
“closely drawn” scrutiny standard from Buckley validating the base contribution limits, but
disagreed with the Court’s conclusion in Buckley respecting aggregate limits on campaign
contributions.73 The McCutcheon decision and revised analysis of aggregate contribution limits
changed the outlook on aggregate contribution limits and brings into question the constitutionality
of comparable regulations.

PART III: MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
McCutcheon involved a challenge to the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) and §
441a(a)(3).74 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) addresses base limit contributions any “person” may make to
individual candidate and political committee, limiting individuals to contribute $5,200 to a
candidate, $32,000 to a national party committee, $10,000 to a local or state party committee, and
$5,000 to a political action committee.75 § 441a(a)(3) provides for aggregate contribution limits an

70

Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 at 39.
Buckley at 39-59.
72
See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 235 (2006).
73
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1437–40.
74
McCutcheon at 1436.
75
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1).
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individual may make over a two year period to all candidates or committees.76 The aggregate
contribution limit mandates that an individual may contribute up to $123,200 to candidate and
non-candidate committees during a two-year election cycle.77 The plaintiffs in McCutcheon
challenged the constitutionality of the aggregate limits regulated by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3), arguing
that the aggregate limits are not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption.78
By way of background, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action, echoing Buckley in
concluding that the aggregate limits in FECA survived First Amendment scrutiny because the
Government had a legitimate interest in preventing “evasion of the base limits.”79 In part, the
district court reached this finding after considering a hypothetical situation whereby a single donor
could contribute to multiple committees and those committees could thereafter transfer the money
to a single committee, thus combining the contributions to exceed the base limits.80 This purported
loophole was foreseen as one example of how a donor may circumvent the base limits, and
therefore justified the requirement for aggregate limits.81 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
district court’s ruling.
The Supreme Court’s analysis began by distinguishing between the “base limits” and the
“aggregate limits.”82 Among the differences, the Court noted that the base limits are a restriction
on the amount of money a donor may contribute to a specific candidate or committee. 83 By
comparison, the aggregate limits impose restrictions on the number of candidates a donor may
contribute to, subject to the limitations of the base limits.84 The difference between quantity of

76

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3).
Id.
78
McCutcheon at 1442.
79
Id.
80
893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (2012); see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 126 (2006).
81
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1442.
82
Id. at 1438–39.
83
McCutcheon at 1448.
84
Id. (emphasis added).
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money an individual may contribute to a candidate and the quantity of candidates to whom an
individual may contribute money became the critical distinction in the Court’s ruling. 85 The issue
facing the Court was whether a restriction upon the number of candidates a donor contributes to
satisfy closely drawn scrutiny standard under Buckley.
The Supreme Court concluded that when evaluating regulations which target political
contributions such regulations are subject to closely drawn scrutiny, and must target “quid pro
quo” corruption or its appearance.86 “Quid pro quo” corruption suggests the notion of a “direct
exchange of an official act for money.”87 “The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo:
dollars for political favors.”88 In Buckley, the Court noted that the $25,000 aggregate limit imposed
a restriction on the number of candidates and committees to whom an individual may contribute.89
The Buckley Court considered the aggregate limits as modest restrictions on First Amendment
speech and thereby permissible to prevent the appearance of quid pro quo corruption through
circumvention of the base limits.90 The McCutcheon plurality disagreed with the validity of the
latter conclusion emphasizing that “an aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an
individual may support . . . is not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”91 The Court considered that absent a
sufficient nexus between the political contribution regulation and prevention of quid pro quo
corruption, such regulation would therefore be invalid for impermissibly restricting First
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McCutcheon at 1463-64.
McCutcheon at 1441, (citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359).
87
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1466.
88
Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)
89
424 U.S. at 28.
90
Id.
91
McCutcheon at 1448.
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Amendment speech. 92 The Court did not find a nexus between the aggregate limits and prevention
of quid pro quo contributions.93
The McCutcheon court reasoned that in simple terms the aggregate limits prohibit fully
contributing to the campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if the contributions fall within the
scope of the base limits.94 Congress, by codifying this limitation, sets forth that the aggregate limits
prevent quid pro quo corruption that may stem from contributing to multiple candidates or party
committees of the same party.95 The McCutcheon court, however, discerned that by creating the
base limits, Congress demarcated the specific contribution amounts that raise an issue of quid pro
quo corruption.96 The Court postulated that “spending large sums of money in connection with
elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official
duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption.”97 Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the
argument that an individual who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to”
elected officials, raising the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.98
The appearance of quid pro quo corruption, however, is applicable only to “the narrow
category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.” 99 The
Court noted funneling money to a particular candidate or party gives rise to quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance and may be regulated.100 However, according to the McCutcheon court,
contributing money to a party or candidate within the amounts specified in the base limits does not

92

Id.
Id; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (where the Court found that evidence that soft money donations raised an
appearance of political corruption was sufficient to uphold the regulations prohibiting same).
94
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1448.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
McConnell at 310.
100
McCutcheon at 1448.
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rise to an inference of quid pro quo corruption, and thus may not be subject to broad restrictions
such as the aggregate limits in FECA.101 In other words, the Court concluded that Congress, by
codifying the base limits specified the amount of money which raises an inference of quid pro quo
corruption. Thus, any contributions within the base limits are per se valid, and do not raise and
inference of quid quo pro corruption. Absent a connection between aggregate limits and quid pro
quo corruption, the Court reasoned that the aggregate limits are unconstitutional. Proponents for
the regulations argued evidence of the appearance of quid pro quo corruption is difficult, if not
impossible to find.102 In response, the Court noted that “the First Amendment requires us to err on
the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”103
As a result of the court’s analysis and conclusion respecting aggregate limits, undermines
thirty-five years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and raises questions as to the validity of federal
and state pay-to-play regulations. Prior to the McCutcheon decision, the Court declined to overrule
Buckley in Randall v. Sorrell104. There, the Court emphasized that overruling Buckley would
“undermine the considerable reliance that Congress and state legislatures have placed upon its
drafting of campaign finance laws.”105 The McCutcheon Court did not exhibit the same reticence
and calls for refined analysis of federal and state pay-to-play regulations. Pay-to-play regulations
involve restrictions on contributions permitted by individuals contracting with the government.
Such regulations are drafted and enacted with the goal of preventing individuals who make
political contributions from using those contributions to gain political favor. On its face, pay-toplay regulations appear specifically designed to prevent quid pro quo corruption. However after

101

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1448.
Id.
103
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
104
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
105
Id. at 234-235.
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McCutcheon, the question presented to legislatures and court’s evaluating pay-to-play regulations
is whether these regulations are closely drawn to meet their goal of preventing quid pro quo
corruption. There multiple federal pay-to-play regulations, in addition to a vast array of state and
local pay-to-play laws and ordinances. Recently, parties have challenged the federal pay-to-play
regulations, in particular the federal contractor contribution ban and the Security and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Political Contribution Rule. The discussion of those challenges and analysis
of the federal and state regulations follows.

IV:

FEDERAL PAY-TO-PLAY REGULATIONS
Federal Contractor Ban on Contributions – 2 U.S.C. § 441c
The Federal Contractor Ban on Contributions is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441c, and prohibits

any “person” who contracts with the United States or any department or agencies of the United
States from directly or indirectly making or soliciting contributions to any political party,
committee, or candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose or use. 106 The
regulation within FECA, that defines a “person” to include an “individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons” other
than the federal government.107 The regulation applies to contributions made in connection with
federal elections, and applies only to the “person” who contracts with the government.108 Of
particular note are the limitations of the contribution ban is specifically tailored to the party
contracting with the government only, and allows the contracting party to establish political action
committees that are capable of making contributions which would otherwise be unlawful under

106

2 U.S.C. § 441c.
2 U.S.C. § 441c(a).
108
2 U.S.C. § 431(11).
107
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the regulation.109 In 2012, federal contractors challenged 2 U.S.C. § 441c in Wagner v. FEC,
arguing that the regulation was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.110
In Wagner, the plaintiffs alleged that the ban on political contributions to federal
contractors violates their First Amendment rights and sought a preliminary injunction preventing
enforcement of 2 U.S. § 441c so that they could make contributions for the 2012 election cycle.111
As noted in Buckley, regulations affecting political contributions implicate an individual’s First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and association.112 The federal contractor ban on
contributions clearly restricts federal contractors’ First Amendment rights by prohibiting them
from making political contributions. Thus, because the federal contractor ban limits individual’s
First Amendment rights, the regulation must be closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption,
and may not unnecessarily abridge First Amendment rights. Emphasizing judicial precedent, the
district court affirmed that there is ‘no doubt that preventing “pay-to-play” deals or pressure on
contractors to give – or the appearance that either is occurring – is sufficiently important to warrant
restrictions on political contributions by federal contractors.”113 Simplified, it is clear to the district
court that the contractor contribution ban was enacted to prevent quid pro quo corruption. This
satisfies the district court’s first inquiry regarding the validity of the regulation under closely drawn
scrutiny. The second question presented to the court is whether the regulation unnecessarily
abridged First Amendment rights.114
The contribution limit at issue in Buckley and McCutcheon differs significantly from the
contribution ban at issue in Wagner. Simply put, the FECA regulation in Buckley and McCutcheon
2 U.S.C. § 441c(a); see Wagner v. Federal Election Comm’n, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86; see also 11 C.F.R. §
115.2(a).
110
Wagner at 84.
111
Id.
112
See supra note 32; see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161.
113
Wagner at 90.
114
Id.
109

18

is a limit upon an individual’s ability to make political contributions, whereas the federal contractor
contribution ban is prohibition or outright restriction upon an individual’s ability to make political
contributions. The difference between the regulations at issue in Buckley and Wagner is the scope
of the regulation and not the degree of infringement upon First Amendment rights.115 Although an
outright ban appears to impermissibly infringe upon First Amendment freedoms, courts prior to
the McCutcheon decision repeatedly upheld contractor contribution bans as constitutional because
of the close nexus between any contribution by contractors and actual or the appearance of
corruption.
In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,116 plaintiffs challenged Connecticut’s ban on
contractor campaign contributions as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.117 Plaintiffs
argued that a ban on contractor contributions is an overly broad restriction of First Amendment
speech and therefore not closely drawn to prevent quid quo pro corruption or its appearance.118
The Second Circuit upheld Connecticut’s ban on contractor campaign contributions in part because
the ban was a product of corruption scandals where public officials accepted gifts from contractors
in exchange for state contracts.119 The Second Circuit noted that a ban on contractor contributions
may have been overbroad to meet the interest of actual corruption.120 However according to the
Second Circuit, the recent scandals brought to light the important interest of preventing the
appearance of corruption, and justified the ban in light of this interest.121 The D.C. Circuit in
Wagner, followed the Second Circuit’s reasoning in upholding the validity of 2 U.S.C. § 441c,
noting that because the ban was enacted in response to a history or evidence of corruption it passes
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muster as closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.122 Furthermore,
the court found that a ban on federal contractor contributions in no way stretches the imagination
to envision that individuals might make campaign contributions to curry political favor.123 Finally,
the court noted that “the judiciary owes special deference to legislative determinations regarding
campaign contribution restrictions,” and stated that “there is less need for the court to interfere
with legislative judgments where the persons affected by the ban have other meaningful avenues
for political association and expression.124 Despite the district court’s conclusions, the reasoning
is subject to further scrutiny in light of the McCutcheon decision and resultant analysis respecting
regulations designed to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.
In McCutcheon, the Supreme Court advised that absent evidence of direct quid pro quo
corruption, the Court may regulate the appearance of corruption.125 However, the appearance of
quid pro quo corruption is applicable only to “the narrow category of money gifts that are directed,
in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder” that in turn provides or may provide political
favors or access in recognition of the monetary gift.126 Critically, the Court emphasized that
“closely drawn” scrutiny requires consideration of both the government interest balanced against
“unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights.127 It is clear that regulation of the federal
contractor contributions is a sufficient government interest to prevent quid pro quo corruption and
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its appearance, the inquiry by the Wagner court after McCutcheon should be does a ban on federal
contractor contributions unnecessarily abridge First Amendment rights. Prior to McCutcheon, the
district court concluded the answer was no, the federal contractor contribution ban did not
unnecessarily abridge First Amendment rights. Following the McCutcheon decision, the answer to
that question is a resounding yes.
In its initial decision, the D.C. Circuit found that the ban on federal contractor contributions
was closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance relying upon (1) the history
and evidence of corruption, (2) deference to the legislature regarding the appropriateness of
contribution restrictions, and (3) the avenues of political association available to federal
contractors irrespective of the ban on contributions.128 Following the McCutcheon decision, none
of these justifications are sufficient for a finding that complete bans on federal contractor
contributions are closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. The Wagner
court correctly found that a history of evidence and corruption underscores the notion that federal
contractor contribution bans satisfy a sufficient government interest. However deference to the
legislature, evidence of corruption, and the avenues of political association outside of political
contributions do not support the conclusion that a complete ban on contributions does not
unnecessarily abridge First Amendment freedoms and is closely drawn to satisfy that interest.
The Wagner court stated that when evaluating whether a regulation is closely drawn, the
court’s duty is to “assess the proportionality of the ban to the government’s asserted interest in
order to ensure that First Amendment freedoms are not impermissibly burdened. 129 On their face,
Federal contractor bans move toward the most restrictive means, an outright ban, without
consideration of more stringent regulation allowing federal contractors to exercise their First
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Amendment rights. The Wagner court states that “the threat of corruption addressed by the
provision at issue here is far from ‘illusory,’ but instead provides a reasonable basis for restricting
political contributions by federal contractors.”130 This statement is an example of the district
court’s reasoning, which was valid prior to McCutcheon, but subject to revised scrutiny postMcCutcheon. The district court relied upon the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Green Party to
conclude that a ban on contractor contributions is consistent with the First Amendment because,
while a proportionally drastic measure, political contributions by contractors might create a
perception of improper influence on state officials.131 This reasoning is no longer valid following
McCutcheon. In McCutcheon, the Court emphasized that “the First Amendment requires us to err
on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”132 The McCutcheon Court
emphasized that multiple alternatives are available to Congress which allow for appropriate
regulation while simultaneously avoiding unnecessary abridgement of First Amendment
freedoms.133 In other words, there were less restrictive means available to Congress to achieve
their goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption. A complete ban on contributions to any official,
candidate, or party is overly broad, and if challenged, § 441c would likely be considered an
unnecessary infringement upon a contractor’s First Amendment rights.
If § 441c is deemed invalid, such a finding would not preclude Congress from creating
more specific restrictions on federal contractor contributions, but in its present form the federal
contractor contribution ban does not pass muster under the McCutcheon analysis because it is
unnecessarily infringes upon First Amendment rights and is not closely drawn to prevent quid pro
quo corruption. Unlike the federal contractor contribution ban which is likely invalid following
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the McCutcheon decision, the SEC Rule 206(4)-5 is an example of a contractor contribution ban
that is closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption.
SEC Rule 206(4)-5
The SEC adopted Rule 206(4)-5 to prevent quid pro quo corruption as it relates to
investment advisers and individuals associated with investment advisors that provide investment
advisory services to the government.134 Rule 206(4)-5 was modelled after Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board’s (“MSRB”) Rules G-37 and G-38 that the SEC believed “significantly curbed
pay-to-play practices in the municipal securities market.”135 The regulations do not ban
contributions to any candidate or political party, but rather are more narrowly tailored to the
officials which oversee or are potentially implicated in the award of the conflicting contract.136
The SEC Rule involves five basic components: (1) a two-year ban on investment advisers
accepting compensation for advisory services from government entities if disqualifying
contributions are made; (2) a ban on directly or indirectly paying a third-party to solicit a
government entity for investment advisory services; (3) a ban on soliciting or coordinating
contributions to officials of government entities to which the investment adviser provides advisory
services (or seeks to provide advisory services; (4) a ban on soliciting or coordinating payments to
state or local political parties in jurisdictions where the investment adviser provides or seeks to
provide advisory services; and (5) disclosure requirements of contributions and payments made by
the advisor.137 Compared to the federal contractor contribution ban, the SEC Rule components are
more specific as to whom the investment advisors (contractors) are prohibited from making
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political contributions to. By including specific restrictions on the recipient of the contribution, the
SEC Rule is more narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption, and would pass muster
under McCutcheon.
The critical distinction between the SEC Rule and the federal contractor ban is that the
SEC Rule only proscribes activity as it relates to contributions to officials of government entities
which the investment advisor provides advisory services, or to political parties in jurisdictions
where the investment advisor provides services.138 The contribution restrictions are limited solely
making contributions to officials or individuals that can influence the award of the government
advisory contract.139 Conversely, the federal contractor contribution ban prohibits contributions to
any political party, candidate, or elected official in the federal government; irrespective of whether
or not that the recipient of the contribution may have influence or effect on the award of the federal
contract. Thus, the SEC Rule, while limiting exercise of certain First Amendment Rights, is
narrowly tailored to address direct quid pro quo corruption by proscribing donations between the
contractor and the specific politicians or officials which may award the contract.140 Beyond the
federal regulations addressing contractor contributions and pay-to-play, multiple states have
enacted comparable legislation to combat the threat of corruption in the award of government
contracts. One example is the New Jersey pay-to-play regulation, which is discussed and analyzed
in the following section.

V:

NEW JERSEY STATE PAY-TO-PLAY REGULATIONS
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Governor James McGreevy introduced New Jersey pay-to-play regulations in 2004,
issuing Executive Order No. 134. The Executive Order, later codified as N.J.S.A. 19:44A-20.4
provides that:
[a] county, or any agency thereof, shall not enter into a contract having an
anticipated value in excess of $17,500, as determined in advance and certified in
writing by the county, agency or instrumentality, with a business entity, except a
contract that is awarded pursuant to a fair and open process, if, during the preceding
one-year period, that business entity has made a contribution that is reportable by
the recipient under P.L. 1973, c.83 (C.19:44A-1 et seq.), to any county committee
of a political party in that county if a member of that political party is serving in an
elective public office of that county when the contract is awarded or to any
candidate committee of any person serving in an elective public office of that
county when the contract is awarded, and
A business entity that has entered into a contract having an anticipated value
in excess of $17,500 with a county, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, except
a contract that is awarded pursuant to a fair and open process, shall not make such
a contribution, reportable by the recipient under P.K. 1973, c. 83 (C. 19:44A-1 et
sq.), to any county committee of a political party in that county if a member of that
political party is serving in an elective public office of that county when the contract
is awarded or any candidate committee of any person serving in an elective public
office of that county when the contract is awarded, during the term of that
contract.141

Of note, the New Jersey regulation proscribes entities holding contracts in excess of $17,500 from
making contributions over $300 to any county committee of a political party if the party is serving
in elective office where the contract was awarded.142 In enacting the regulation, the New Jersey
State Senate stated that the purpose of the bill was to “reduce the risk of actual or perceived
corruption”, and emphasized that such corruption may result from elected officials that award (or
control the award) of the contract receiving contributions from business entities holding or seeking
government contracts.143 The constitutionality of the regulation was challenged in New Jersey v.
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Soto144, wherein the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld a prohibition on contributions by
casino employees.145 In upholding the pay-to-play regulation, the Appellate Division applied the
Buckley test, requiring (1) a compelling state interest; and (2) that the regulation be sufficiently
narrow and rationally related to the state interest.146 As discussed in this note, the Supreme Court
reformed the standard applicable to campaign contribution regulations in McCutcheon, requiring
that the regulation (1) be enacted to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance in the sphere
of government contracting, and (2) is closely drawn to meet that goal.147 Thus, if a party challenged
the New Jersey regulations following the McCutcheon decision, would they pass muster as being
closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption?
The regulations, on their face, appear narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption
by proscribing contributions from contractors to individuals that directly affect the award of the
state contract.148 Particularly, the regulations restrict contributions when an individual makes a
contribution to officials, committees, candidates or political parties that control award of the
contract, or serve in a district where the contract is being awarded. 149 Unlike the aggregate limits
deemed overly broad in McCutcheon, preventing contributions from contractors to individuals or
entities that are positioned to directly affect the award of the contract implicates direct quid pro
quo corruption and is likely not an overly broad restriction on First Amendment speech. Thus,
New Jersey’s state pay-to-play regulations would likely pass muster under the McCutcheon
analysis.
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While New Jersey imposes pay-to-play regulations at the state level, four counties in New
Jersey and 170 municipalities also enacted pay-to-play laws.150 Following the McCutcheon, each
of these regulations may be subject to scrutiny by individuals seeking to make political
contributions and warrants analysis.
Atlantic County
Atlantic County’s pay-to-play ordinance closely mirrors the state pay-to-play regulation,
but expands the scope of that regulation beyond the constitutional means justified in
McCutcheon.151 Specifically, the ordinance imposes a $2,500 aggregate contribution limit on
contracting entities for contributions to “all candidates for elective County office and to
officeholders with ultimate responsibility for award of the contract, and all County and state
political parties, municipal party committees within Atlantic County and PACs.”152 Furthermore,
the ordinance prohibits the county from entering into a contract with a professional business entity
that has made a contribution in the preceding calendar year to one of the above-mentioned political
bodies.153
Application of the McCutcheon ruling clearly invalidates the $2,500 aggregate contribution
limit on contracting entities. The analysis in McCutcheon requires (1) prevention of quid pro quo
corruption, and (2) regulation closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption. The Atlantic
County regulation’s prohibition on contributions to all county and state political parties, and all
municipal party committees within Atlantic County would likely be considered overly broad

150

Atlantic, Bergen, Burlington, Essex, Gloucester, Mercer, and Monmouth County.
Atlantic County, N.J., Ordinance No. 10 (2007), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fwww.nj.gov%2Fstate%2Fordinances%2Fatlantic-county-board-of-chosen-freeholders-on10.pdf&ei=wp8kVbWNBfeasQTj74CgDw&usg=AFQjCNFM1SxecOIi_6GsCvHfMV5eYRLGQ&sig2=ZBNw2y02kzLqLG_H2dCLBw&bvm=bv.90237346,d.cWc&cad=rja .
152
Id.
153
Id.
151

27

restrictions that do not address quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.154 The New Jersey payto-play regulation prohibits contributions to office holders or candidates that directly control or
affect the award of the state contract.155 The Atlantic County ordinance expands upon the
contribution prohibition to include all county and state political parties and all municipal
committees within Atlantic County. This expansion, absent evidence to suggest actual quid pro
quo corruption does not satisfy the closely drawn standard. It is difficult to consider that
contributions to state or municipal party committees prevent quid pro quo corruption as it relates
to a contract awarded by a county or its departments. One may argue that state or municipal
committees influence the award of contracts, however the Supreme Court emphasized that the First
Amendment forces us to err on the side of protecting individuals rights.156 As noted in
McCutcheon, “there is a clear, administrable line between money beyond the base limits funneled
in an identifiable way to a candidate-for which the candidate feels obligated-and money within the
base limits given widely to a candidate’s party—for which the candidate, like all other members
of the party, feel grateful.”157 Aggregate limits on contributions to municipal, county and state
party committees are distinguishable from the base limits on contributions to the officials,
officeholders, or candidates which have responsibility for award of the contract and thus likely fail
to satisfy the McCutcheon closely drawn standard.
Bergen County
Bergen County’s pay-to-play ordinance provides a one-year prohibition on contractor
contributions to any candidate for county-wide elective office or holder of elective office in Bergen
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County.158 Furthermore, Bergen County imposes both base and aggregate limits on the amount a
contracting entity may make to county-wide elective office or office holders, and an additional
base limit on contributions to county political parties.159
Bergen County’s pay-to-play laws proscription on contributions to candidates for elective
office or holders of elective office in Bergen County could likely be substantiated as a measure
preventing actual quid pro quo corruption. The aggregate limits, while invalid in McCutcheon, are
presumptively valid in Bergen County because the ordinance limits the aggregate contribution
limits to county-wide elective offices or office holders, or the individuals who may be directly
implicated in award of a county contract.160 The Bergen County ordinance’s prohibition on
contribution to county-wide offices or office holders is distinct from Atlantic County’s prohibition
on contributions to all state and municipal party committees. Under McCutcheon, the Bergen
County ordinance appears closely to prohibit actual quid pro quo corruption because it targets
contribution limits for officials and offices directly awarding or capable of influencing the award
of contracts only.
Monmouth County
Monmouth County adopted the state pay-to-play legislation codified at N.J.S.A. 19:44A1.161 Monmouth County’s regulations are identical to the state pay-to-play legislation. As
previously discussed, New Jersey’s pay-to-play regulations likely pass muster under the
McCutcheon analysis because the regulations prohibit contributions from contractors to the
politicians or individuals that are able to influence the award of the government contracts.
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Therefore, because Monmouth County’s regulations are identical to the state pay-to-play
regulations, Monmouth County’s regulations would pass muster if challenged.

VI:

INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ON FEDERAL ELECTIONS AND
THE AWARD OF FEDERAL CONTRACTS
A 2011 study examined the success of corporations in securing government contracts

through campaign donations.162 The researcher conducted case studies of two instances of
politically motivated contracts — one related to the Iraq war and the other with Hurricane Katrina
— and analyzed data from 367 firms with corporate PACs active between 1979 and 2006 across a
variety of industries. The study determined that for each additional $201,220 in campaign
contributions, a firm could expect to receive an additional 107 contracts on average. This translates
into roughly $5,300,000 in additional revenues.163 These examples clearly demonstrate, at a
minimum, a correlation between campaign contributions and the award of federal contracts. At
worst, it indicates that money not only buys access, but influences contract award decisions and
firm profits.164
According to the FEC, a record-breaking $7 billion was spent on federal elections in
2012.165 Critics of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon attribute the
record breaking amount of money in federal elections to the departure from regulations limiting
corporate expenditures and aggregate limits on individual contributions.166 Analysis of
successfully Congressional races is an instructive example of the potential effect of the
McCutcheon decision. The Center for Responsive Politics found that in 2012, the average winner
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of a Congressional race spent $1.5 million.167 The McCutcheon decision eliminated the $123,200
per cycle cap on individual donations to federal candidates. 168 Thus, following the decision,
individual donors are capable of giving up to $3.5 million each cycle to all federal candidates,
PACs and political parties.169 Assuming the average winner of a Congressional race needs to spend
approximately $1.5-2 million; one wealthy donor could theoretically fund two winning
Congressional candidates.170 Taking the numbers a step further, Democrats and Republicans raised
$1.5 billion for Congressional races in 2010; thus, 429 donors, each donating the $1.5 million
maximum post McCutcheon could fund the winning candidates in the 2010 election. 171 In other
words, if the aggregate limits were struck down prior to the 2010 election, 429 individuals could
have theoretically funded every winning Congressional candidate.
While it is unlikely that 429 individuals will control the outcome of every federal election
in 2016, the example above elucidates that at the very least McCutcheon will increase the amount
of money in politics, and enables donors with deeper pockets to exert influence through political
contributions that the average voter is unable to. In the 2012 election, 28% of all disclosed political
contributions came from 31,385 individuals.172 This equates to approximately one ten-thousandth
of the U.S. population making over a quarter of the political contributions for the 2012 election.173
The gap between the average voting citizen and citizens exerting political influence will only
widen following the McCutcheon decision. The effect of the decision is not limited to federal
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politics, but will trickle down to the state level as state legislatures review and revise their pay-toplay legislation to comport with the McCutcheon decision.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCutcheon struck down the aggregate campaign
contribution limits in FECA. In McCutcheon, the Court determined that aggregate campaign
contribution limits do not combat the valid constitutional interest of preventing quid pro quo
corruption and therefore fail to satisfy the closely drawn scrutiny standard. This Note argues that
applying the McCutcheon analysis has widespread effect on federal and state regulations
addressing campaign contributions, specifically, the Federal Contractor Contribution ban and
several of New Jersey’s county’s pay-to-play regulations would not survive a First Amendment
challenge following application of the McCutcheon analysis. The remaining issue is whether the
legal effect of the McCutcheon decision will have practical implications.174 For example, if the
Federal Contractor Contribution ban is deemed unconstitutional, federal contractors would be
permitted to make political contributions for the first time in forty years. The effect of removing
but the studies of campaign finance and political contracts shed some light on the possible result.
While many researchers agree that contributions do not influence decision-making via quid
pro quo, there is evidence to support the conclusion that contributions help organized interests gain
access to and develop friendly relations with Congress members, which sometimes brings tangible
benefits. Firms donating more money have a greater ability to form relationships and, perhaps,
receive more contracts.”175 After McCutcheon, the maximum individual contribution to a federal
candidate currently is $2,600 per election, with the primary and general counting as separate
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elections, for a total of $5,200 per candidate during a single two-year election cycle. But in the
absence of an overall cap on spending, the donor could, in theory, well over a million dollars before
running out of federal candidates and committees to support.176
With evidence to support the conclusion that contributions not only increase political
influence, but lead to greater financial benefits, the Court’s decision in McCutcheon will likely
have far reaching implications on the already muddled area of campaign finance regulation. In the
short term, the decision enables deep pockets to exert increased influence in federal elections and
on the award of government contract – the long term effects, only time will tell.
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